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ABSTRACT
Objective Assess the impact of infusion pump
technologies (traditional pump vs smart pump vs smart
pump with barcode) on nurses’ ability to safely
administer intravenous medications.
Design Experimental study with a repeated measures
design.
Setting High-ﬁdelity simulated inpatient unit.
Results The nurses remedied 60% of “wrong drug”
errors. This rate did not vary as a function of pump type.
The nurses remedied “wrong patient” errors more often
when using the barcode pump (88%) than when using
the traditional pump (46%) or the smart pump (58%)
(Cochran Q¼14.36; p<0.05). The number of nurses who
remedied “wrong dose hard limit” errors was higher
when using the smart pump (75%) and the barcode
pump (79%) than when using the traditional pump (38%)
(Cochran Q¼12.13; p<0.003). Conversely, there was no
difference in remediation of “wrong dose soft limit”
errors across pump types. The nurses’ pump
programming was less accurate when mathematical
conversions were required. Success rates on secondary
infusions were low (55.6%) and did not vary as
a function of pump type.
Conclusions These ﬁndings indicate that soft
(changeable) limits in smart infusion pumps had no
signiﬁcant effect in preventing dosing errors. Provided
that smart pumps are programmed with hard
(unchangeable) limits, they can prevent dosing errors,
thereby increasing patient safety. Until barcode pumps
are integrated with other systems within the medication
administration process, their role in enhancing patient
safety will be limited. Further improvements to pump
technologies are needed to mitigate risks associated
with intravenous infusions, particularly secondary
infusions.
Medication errors are the most signiﬁcant cause of
medical injuries, representing 19.4% of all adverse
events.
1 Intravenous (IV) infusions are frequent
contributors to medication errors.
2e4 General
infusion pumps were designed to improve accu-
racy of IV infusions by allowing nurses to prog-
ramme an hourly rate and volume. However, most
adverse drug events (ADEs) associated with IV
infusion devices result from nurses manually
inputting incorrect settings into the pump.
5e7
Common errors include unit errors, multiple-
of-ten errors, miscalculations and push-button
mistakes.
8 Fatal errors have occurred as a result of
decimal entry errors (eg, programming morphine
at 90 mg/h instead of 9.0 mg/h
9). Thus, although
infusion pumps have revolutionised the way
nurses deliver intravenous therapy, they have also
led to ADEs.
9
To address the high incidence of infusion errors,
manufacturershavedevelopedpumpsthathavedose
error reduction systems (DERS), which include
hospital-deﬁneddruglibrarieswithdosinglimitsand
clinical advisories (ie, smart pumps). While tradi-
tional general-purpose infusion pumps have a wide
range of acceptable programming parameters, smart
pumps are designed with drug-speciﬁc safety soft-
ware to help nurses remedy programming errors.
Smart pumps provide either a “soft” limit warning
(allows nurse to override the limit and continue
infusing) or “hard” limit warning (requires nurse to
reprogramme the pump within acceptable parame-
ters). Although smart pumps contain safeguards
against dosing errors, they do not prevent errors
related to the remaining rights (ie, right drug,
patient, route, time). Smart pumps with bar code
readers (ie, barcode pumps) were designed to help
prevent these remaining errors.
Researchers have explored the beneﬁts of using
smart pumps compared to traditional pumps.
However, outcomes have been mixed. Although
some studies
2 81 21 3found that smart pumps reduce
errors compared to traditional pumps, others
14 15
showed that smart pumps do not reduce the frequ-
ency of programming errors and can even introduce
new errors. This past research, however, has impor-
tant limitations. Several prospective studies
14 16 17
assessed the potential impact of smart pumps on
medication errors. These studies, however, did not
explicitly evaluate whether error identiﬁcation was
duetosmartpumpsorwhethererrorsmayhavebeen
detected with traditional pumps, thus making it
difﬁcult to determine the value of smart pumps.
Other researchers
18e20 derived data from hospital
incident reports to evaluate IV pump errors. These
results, however, are not adequately quantiﬁable
because of underreporting.
To our knowledge, there has been no study that
has empirically tested the comparative effects of
pump technology on safe medication administra-
tion. We, therefore, conducted an experimental
study to directly compare pump type (ie, tradi-
tional vs smart vs barcode) and type of infusion
task (with some planted errors) to investigate the
impact of different infusion pumps on nurses’
ability to safely deliver IV medications.
METHODS
Participants
Nurses were recruited from the University Health
Network, Toronto, Ontario, Canada. Participants
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Education and trainingsigned up using sheets located in clinical care areas and were
remunerated for their participation. Table 1 describes the nurses’
characteristics.
Design
Participants delivered infusions with each of three pump types
under seven task conditions, some of which contained planted
errors. Thus, the design was a 3 (pump type)37 (infusion task)
repeated measures design. Four tasks required intermittent
infusions and three required continuous infusions. The order of
task conditions and pump types was counterbalanced to avoid
carry-over effects.
Another variable in this study was whether the nurses had
to perform conversion calculations to programme the pumps
from information provided in the order. Physician orders were
presented in the exact manner the hospital presented orders at
the time of the study. For continuous infusions, no conversions
were required because the information provided on the order
was consistent with the information required to programme the
three pumps. For intermittent infusions, however, conversions
were required when programming the traditional pump because
the information provided on the order was not in accord with
theparametersrequiredbythepump(seeﬁgure1foranexample).
Location and apparatus
Laboratory
The experiment was conducted in a laboratory that allowed
high-ﬁdelity simulation of an inpatient unit, including patient
beds, furniture, Computerised Physician Order Entry (CPOE)
system, IV infusion equipment, and paperwork. This laboratory
had observational rooms with one-way glass, and each session
was video and audio recorded. Mannequins were used instead of
patients. Physician orders were presented on a CPOE system to
reﬂect how nurses in this study currently view orders.
Pumps
Three pumps were selected from two different manufacturers.
The traditional pump was from one manufacturer and the smart
pump and barcode pump were both from another. The tradi-
tional pump was the device nurses currently use, and the smart
pump and barcode pump consisted of devices that nurses had no
previous experience using.
With the barcode pump, we replicated an environment where
thepumpscannercouldbeusedtoscanthebarcodeonthepatient
armband, nurse badge, and medication IV label. The barcode
pump could detect if the infusion was being administered to the
right patient. In a fully integrated system, the barcode pump
server would communicate with the CPOE system and/or the
pharmacy information system and consequently, would ensure
compliance with other rights. Given that this fully integrated
approach is rare, we opted to implement the barcode pump in the
form that most hospitals can currently accommodate.
Tasks
Tasks and associated medication orders and drug labels were
designed with the help of hospital pharmacists and nurses to
ensure validity and nurse familiarity with the tasks. Table 2
describes the tasks.
Procedure
Each participant was provided with a 15-min training session on
a given pump. The training covered the programming tasks
required in the experiment and replicated typical vendor
instruction. There were three patient mannequins in separate
beds. Participants were briefed by a confederate nurse (ie, actor
playing the role of a nurse) on the patients’ medical history,
given physician orders for IV infusions and asked to programme
the pumps accordingly. The confederate nurse remained in the
room, and participants were asked to communicate with her if
they became confused. When prompted with a question, the
confederate nurse asked the participant what they would do
intuitively. If the participant remained confused, the confederate
nurse provided up to three hints, after which she guided the
participant through task completion. Once the participant
completed all tasks, he or she received training on another pump
and the procedure repeated itself until all pumps had been
evaluated. Behind a one-way mirror, test facilitators recorded the
number of remedied errors, pump programming accuracy and
other observations.
RESULTS
Each participant completed 21 infusions. Cochran’s Q test was
used to assess (a) error resolution, (b) pump programming accu-
racyand(c)successrateofsecondaryinfusions,allasafunctionof
pump type. Cochran Q tests were followed by pairwise compar-
isons (using Bonferroni correction) between different combina-
tions of pump types using the McNemar c
2 test.
Error resolution
Wrong drug
Out of 72 infusions that contained planted drug errors (ie, three
errors per participant), the participants remedied errors on 43
(60%) entries. Pump type did not signiﬁcantly impact the ability
to remedy “wrong drug” errors (p>0.1). Thus, none of these
pumps helped the nurses remedy wrong drug errors.
Table 1 Participant characteristics
Approximate size of eligible population from institution: 3000
Total no. nurse participants: 24
Sexes: 4 men and 20 women
Characteristic Frequency (n[24)
Age range
18e35 15
36e45 2
46e60 7
Clinical care area
Cardiac intensive care unit 4
Cardiovascular intensive care unit 4
Emergency 3
General surgery 4
General internal medicine 2
Post-anaesthesia care unit 4
Transplant unit 3
Role in hospital
Full-time registered nurse 22
Part-time registered nurse 1
Casual registered nurse 1
Years of nursing experience
1e4 years 12
5e15 years 4
>15 years 8
Current frequency of traditional infusion pump use*
<once a day 2
1e2 times a day 2
3e5 times a day 6
>5 times a day 14
*No nurses had previous experience with smart infusion pumps including those used in this
study.
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Education and trainingWrong patient
There was a signiﬁcant difference in the resolution of patient ID
errors across pumps [Cochran Q¼14.36; df¼2; p<0.05]. The
number of nurses (out of 24) who remedied patient identiﬁcation
errors was signiﬁcantly higher with the barcode pump (21 (88%))
thanwiththetraditionalpump(11(46%))orthesmartpump(14
(58%)). The difference between the traditional pump and the
smart pump, however, was not signiﬁcant. Thus, the automatic
patient identiﬁcation veriﬁcation on the barcode pump signiﬁ-
cantly increased the nurses’ resolution of “wrong patient” errors.
Wrong dose hard limit
There was a signiﬁcant difference in the number of wrong dose
hard limit errors remedied across pumps (Cochran Q¼12.13;
df¼2; p<0.003]. The number of nurses who remedied critical
overdose errors was signiﬁcantly higher with the smart pump
(18 (75%)) and the barcode pump (19 (79%)) than with the
traditional pump (9 (38%)). Thus, results suggest that when
faced with hard limit alerts, nurses typically remedy the error.
Participants who failed to remedy the error with the smart
pump and the barcode pump opted out of the dose-checking
technology after exceeding the hard limit and used the pump in
its standard rate-based mode (ie, no-safeguard mode).
Wrong dose soft limit
There was no signiﬁcant difference in the nurses’ ability to
remedy soft limit overdose errors across pumps (error remedied
by 12 (50%) participants with the traditional pump vs 15 (63%)
participants with the smart pump vs 18 (75%) participants with
the barcode pump; p>0.1). Although the smart pump and
barcode pump provide out-of-limit alerts, many nurses elected to
override the alert. Thus, the results indicate that when provided
with the ﬂexibility to override limits, nurses often do so, even
when clinically inappropriate.
Figure 1 Example of programming an
intermittent infusion.
Table 2 Task descriptions
Task name Description
Wrong drug Label on the IV drug bag did not match
the drug prescribed on the physician order.
Wrong patient Patient identiﬁcation armband on the
mannequin did not correspond to the
patient information (name, date of birth,
and medication registration number) on the
physician order.
Wrong dose hard limit Dose provided on the physician order was
outside of the allowable hard limit speciﬁed
in the hospital’s IV formulary; thus, the dose
was clinically inappropriate.
Wrong dose soft limit Dose provided on the physician order
was outside of the allowable soft limit
speciﬁed in the hospital’s IV formulary;
thus the dose was clinically inappropriate.
Drug not in library Drug prescribed on the physician’s order
was not contained in the smart pump
and bar code pump
drug library.
Secondary infusion task
(maintenance ﬂuid and
therapeutic drug)
Nurse participant was required to programme
both a maintenance infusion and a secondary
(ie, “piggyback”) infusion. Although no
errors were planted in this condition, we
assessed the prevalence and nature of
errors associated with secondary
intravenous infusions.
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Education and trainingPump programming accuracy
1. Continuous Infusions (no conversion required across all
pumps):
For tasks requiring continuous infusions, there was no
difference in the number of accurate entries across pump
types (p>0.1 for all tasks). Altogether, 216 infusions were
performed, and participants were accurate on 203 (94%)
entries. Thus, when the parameters included on the orders
matched those required from the pump, participants’ entries
were overall accurate regardless of pump type. However, even
a 94% accuracy rate might be considered inadequate.
2. Intermittent Infusions (conversion required for the tradi-
tional pump vs no conversion required for the smart pump
and barcode pump):
For tasks requiring intermittent infusions, participants’
entries were signiﬁcantly more accurate with the smart
pump and the barcode pump than with the traditional pump
(p<0.01 for all tasks). Altogether, 72 infusions were
performed with each pump. Participants were accurate on
42 (58%) infusions performed using the traditional pump, 67
(93%) using the smart pump, and 65 (90%) using the barcode
pump. The magnitude of entry errors varied between 1.2 to 6
times higher than the correct parameter. Thus, the mismatch
between physician order and the traditional pump menu
forced users to perform conversions, resulting in incorrect
entries. All errors were over-infusions; some appeared to be
conversion errors while others appeared to be related to
clinicians’ reliance on their previous experience.
Secondary infusion errors
There was no signiﬁcant difference in the nurses’ ability to
successfully programme secondary infusions across pump types
(p>0.1). Altogether, 24 infusions were performed with each
pump. Participants successfully programmed 12 (50%)
secondary infusions with the traditional pump, 16 (67%) with
the smart pump and 12 (50%) with the barcode pump. Thus,
secondary infusion errors were high across all pumps. More
details are provided in table 3.
DISCUSSION
This study adds to the literature by explicitly comparing and
quantifying the effects of pump types on the nurses’ ability to
safely administer IV medication and by identifying errors that
are not addressed by current pumps. Certain errors that were
potentially preventable by smart pumps or barcode pumps (eg,
soft limit overdose errors) were due to deviations from policies.
Our ﬁndings are consistent with other studies,
8 10 11 which
showed that nurses often override soft limit alerts when clini-
cally inappropriate. Furthermore, our ﬁndings suggest that when
faced with hard limit warnings, nurses respond in a safe manner.
However, many hospitals do not implement the hard limit
feature. Other errors (eg, secondary infusion errors), were not
preventable by smart or barcode technologies.
Our results are also consistent with other ﬁndings,
21 indi-
cating that errors related to setup and administration of
secondary infusions have lead to adverse events. Furthermore,
researchers
18 22 23 have reported that confusion between dosing
units and/or concentrations when using smart pumps lead to
overdoses. Our ﬁndings concur and provide further evidence that
variation in IV medication practices is associated with increased
risks.
Finally, our results show that some errors (eg, undetected
wrong drug errors) were due to a lack of integration between the
pump and other components (eg, CPOE) of the medication
delivery system. Thus, effective use of pump technology is
dependent not only on the design of the pump itself but also on
the way it is implemented. Institutions must promote a culture
of safety that encourages nurses to think critically, evaluate
pump warnings and limit overrides to circumstances that have
been carefully assessed.
Ithasbeenestimatedthatapproximately44.0%ofUShospitals
use smart pumps.
24 To optimise integration of smart pumps,
healthcare institutions must dedicate a signiﬁcant operational
budget to cover costs including maintenance and licensing, drug
library updating, continuous quality improvement analysis/
reporting and costs related to training and maintaining nurse
proﬁciency. Currently, hospitals may be investing three to four
times more money into smart pumps compared to traditional
pumps without realising noteworthy safety beneﬁts.
While pumps with barcoding hold a lot of promise, smart
pump and IT vendors have not yet fully established an inte-
grated approach that ensures connectivity between medication
management technologies. Our ﬁndings show that until hospi-
tals can achieve full connectivity between technologies, barcode
pumps will help prevent certain errors that earlier pump
versions could not address (eg, wrong patient errors), but will
continue to permit others (eg, wrong drug).
There are limitations to our study. The small sample size and
the simulation of a real inpatient unit limit the generalisability
Table 3 Frequency, percentage and potential consequences of secondary infusion errors
Error type
Frequency
(n[32) Percentage Potential consequences
Bag mis-alignment (eg, positioning the
therapeutic drug bag at or below the level
of the maintenance ﬂuid bag)
12 37% Mixing and concurrently delivering the
therapeutic and maintenance ﬂuids
Programming errors
(eg, conversion calculation errors)
9 28.13% Delivering the maintenance ﬂuid and/or
the therapeutic drug at an incorrect rate
Confusion in the programming sequence
(eg, programming the therapeutic drug
at the rate of the maintenance ﬂuid)
6 18.75% Infusing incorrect infusion rates of the
therapeutic drug and/or maintenance ﬂuid
Forgetting to open the clamp on the
therapeutic tubing
3 9.38% Accidental administration of the maintenance
ﬂuid when intending to initiate the therapeutic
drug infusion, and the maintenance ﬂuid
being infused at the rate of the therapeutic
drug
Tubing arrangement errors (eg, connecting the
infusion line from the therapeutic drug bag into
the wrong port on the primary infusion line)
2 6.25% Free-ﬂowing therapeutic drug into the patient
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Education and trainingof the results. However, signiﬁcant differences were detected
nonetheless. The large number of planted errors might have
inﬂuenced participants to behave differently (eg, be more alert to
errors) than they would under clinical circumstances where
these errors occur less frequently. Participants had no previous
experience with smart pumps. Therefore, results are represen-
tative of nurses who receive vendor training but have little
experience using the technology. Although our results can be
generalised to a novice smart pump user population, they are
consistent with ﬁndings from studies where nurses had experi-
ence with smart pumps. For example, our results are coincident
with researchers who found that nurses often override smart
pump safety limits.
8 10 11 It is possible that nurses in this study
overrode limits to please the researcher and carry out instruc-
tions as indicated. This is unlikely, however, given that partici-
pants were explicitly asked to underscore problematic drug
orders. Researchers have found that safety overrides are
frequently due to alert fatigue, a mental state resulting from
many alerts consuming time and mental energy.
25e29 Other
researchers attribute overrides to alerts being lengthy, difﬁcult to
interpret and lacking clarity as to clinical consequences.
29 30
A deeper understanding of how to design effective alerts could
be developed by assessing the following: (a) how cognitive
processes contribute to clinicians’ response to alerts; (b) clini-
cians’ reasons for overriding alerts (eg, ignore, misinterpret,
incorrect selection); (c) how to incorporate effective handling of
safety alerts without interrupting workﬂow and (d) how to
increase clinician trust and responsiveness to smart pump alerts.
Future work should also focus on achieving safer systems by
integrating components at various stages (eg, ordering,
prescribing, administering) of the medication delivery process.
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